find() trusted the metadata index's returned ids: it loaded each id's entity
and returned it, checking only that the entity existed — never that it actually
matched the query. The indexes are acceleration structures; the loaded entity
is ground truth. A stale or cross-bucket index posting (e.g. an id left in a
field-value bucket by a delete or an `update({ field: undefined })`) therefore
surfaced an entity matching NEITHER the requested type NOR the where filter — a
production report saw a timeslot (NounType.Event) returned for
`find({ type: Person, where: { entityType: 'staff' } })`.
Add a single egress chokepoint after the result IIFE that re-validates every
result with `entityMatchesFind` (type/subtype/where/service/excludeVFS) — the
live-path mirror of the historical path's per-candidate check in db.ts. It
covers every find() branch (metadata, vector, text, proximity, graph) and
`similar()` (which delegates to find) in one place. A no-op on a healthy index;
on a corrupted one it drops the bad row instead of returning a phantom. Full
unit + integration gate green confirms the where re-validation is consistent
with the index (no valid rows dropped).
This is the brainy-side safety net. The durable corruption itself lives in the
metadata index that owns the query (the native provider when present) and is
addressed separately.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
101 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
101 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @module find-index-integrity-guard.test
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* @description Regression for the "phantom row" class (Venue 2026-06-24): a
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* corrupt/stale metadata-index posting must never surface an entity that does
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* not actually match the find() predicate.
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*
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* The metadata index is an acceleration structure; the loaded entity is ground
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* truth. find() re-validates every result against `type`/`subtype`/`where`/
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* `service` at a single egress chokepoint (the live-path mirror of the
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* historical path's `entityMatchesFind`). These tests inject a poisoned
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* `getIdsForFilter` (the exact failure mode seen in production: a native index
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* returns an id whose record matches NEITHER the type nor the where filter) and
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* assert the phantom is dropped while the genuine matches survive.
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*/
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach } from 'vitest'
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import { Brainy } from '../../../src/brainy'
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import { NounType } from '../../../src/types/graphTypes'
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describe('find() index-integrity guard (phantom row class)', () => {
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let brain: Brainy<any>
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let staffId: string
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let timeslotId: string
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let customerId: string
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beforeEach(async () => {
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brain = new Brainy({ requireSubtype: false, storage: { type: 'memory' } })
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await brain.init()
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// A real staff Person (the only legitimate match for the roster query).
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staffId = await brain.add({
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data: 'Kristine Perry',
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type: NounType.Person,
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metadata: { entityType: 'staff', firstName: 'Kristine', lastName: 'Perry' }
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})
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// A timeslot Event — matches NEITHER type:Person NOR where.entityType:'staff'
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// (the production phantom was exactly this: a NounType.Event timeslot).
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timeslotId = await brain.add({
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data: 'kitten-experience 2026-08-19 12:00',
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type: NounType.Event,
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metadata: { entityType: 'timeslot', date: '2026-08-19', startTime: '12:00' }
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})
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// A Person that matches type:Person but NOT where.entityType:'staff' — proves
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// the WHERE leg of the guard, not just the structural type leg.
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customerId = await brain.add({
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data: 'Walk-in Customer',
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type: NounType.Person,
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metadata: { entityType: 'customer', firstName: 'Walk-in' }
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})
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})
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it('healthy index: the discriminant query returns only the staff Person', async () => {
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const rows = await brain.find({ type: NounType.Person, where: { entityType: 'staff' }, limit: 100 })
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).toEqual([staffId])
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})
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it('drops a phantom of the WRONG TYPE that a corrupt index leaks into the where bucket', async () => {
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// Poison the metadata index so it returns the timeslot's id for the staff
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// query — the precise production corruption (a cross-bucket/stale posting).
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const mi = (brain as any).metadataIndex
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const original = mi.getIdsForFilter.bind(mi)
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mi.getIdsForFilter = async (filter: any): Promise<string[]> => {
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const ids = await original(filter)
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return ids.includes(timeslotId) ? ids : [...ids, timeslotId]
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}
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const rows = await brain.find({ type: NounType.Person, where: { entityType: 'staff' }, limit: 100 })
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// The timeslot (NounType.Event, entityType:'timeslot') must NOT appear.
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).not.toContain(timeslotId)
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// The genuine staff row survives.
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).toEqual([staffId])
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mi.getIdsForFilter = original
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})
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it('drops a phantom of the RIGHT TYPE but WRONG where-value (exercises the where leg)', async () => {
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// The customer is a Person (passes type) but entityType:'customer' (fails
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// where). A corrupt index leaking it into the 'staff' bucket must still be
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// rejected by the where re-validation.
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const mi = (brain as any).metadataIndex
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const original = mi.getIdsForFilter.bind(mi)
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mi.getIdsForFilter = async (filter: any): Promise<string[]> => {
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const ids = await original(filter)
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return ids.includes(customerId) ? ids : [...ids, customerId]
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}
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const rows = await brain.find({ type: NounType.Person, where: { entityType: 'staff' }, limit: 100 })
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).not.toContain(customerId)
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).toEqual([staffId])
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mi.getIdsForFilter = original
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})
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it('a healthy query for the phantom\'s own bucket still returns it (guard is not over-eager)', async () => {
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// Sanity: the guard must only drop genuine non-matches. Querying the
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// timeslot's real bucket returns it normally.
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const rows = await brain.find({ type: NounType.Event, where: { entityType: 'timeslot' }, limit: 100 })
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expect(rows.map((r) => r.id)).toEqual([timeslotId])
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})
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})
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